LIONHEART – the legend of Hari Singh Nalwa/Chapter 2 – The Battle of Kasur

By

GS Goraya

In February, 1807, a weary messenger arrived at the camp of Maharajah Ranjit Singh. He would have had no time to look around and admire the bare beauty of the Kangra hills in the rocky reaches of the middle Himalayas, not too far away from the icy peaks where the snow never melted. He carried an urgent message for Ranjit Singh. The Maharajah, reading the message, would have had every reason to worry.

The Nawab of Kasur Nizamuddin Khan, a tribute paying nominal vassal of the Sikh Durbar, was dead. He had been replaced by his brother Qutubuddin Khan. And the new Nawab of Kasur was a man with a mission. Kasur under Nizamuddin had been a tributary of the Lahore Durbar – even if the relation was always an uncomfortable one and had to be enforced many times through a show of arms. Qutubuddin not only repudiated all relations with the infidel Sikhs, he had in fact vowed to remove them from the land he claimed as his own.

The Pathans of Kasur had controlled the tract of land around the city, between the Sutlej and Beas rivers, since the time of the Mughal Emperor Akbar (1556–1605). The ancestors of Qutubuddin had in fact carried the mantle of ghazi – holy warriors – against the Sardar Banda Singh Bahadur, founder of the first (short-lived) Sikh Empire (lasting from 1708 to 1716). The battles with the armies of Banda Bahadur has not ended well for the Nawabs of Kasur. Bazid Khan, the then Nawab, and his nephew Shamshuddin Khan, had fallen at the Battle of Pathankot, both, slain in the battle by the legendary warrior, Baba Binod Singh. Their graves were still in Kasur.

The reminder of this fate, however, did not deter Qutubuddin, a proud man, who probably disdained his brother’s subservience to the Sikh Maharajah. Preparations for the liberation of Kasuriya lands had probably begun even before the death of Nizamuddin, for when Ranjit Singh received the intelligence report at Kangra a teeming army had already gathered at Kasur, and was possibly days away from striking at Lahore.

The Maharajah would have been more than slightly perturbed.

Through the winter, he along with the best of the Khalsa Army, had been campaigning far east of Lahore, beyond the frontiers of Punjab, in the domains of the Kangra state. In the previous year, the armies of the Nepali Gurkha King Amar Singh Thapa had attacked Kangra, after conquering the petty Rajas of the Kumaon and Garhwal, overrunning its frontier defences from the eastern hills. The King of Kangra, Sansar Chand had dispatched his brother Fateh Chand to Ranjit Singh for help, despite his own history of skirmishes with the Sikhs. Ranjit Singh was quick to respond. Striking up from the plains, the Khalsa Army not only repelled the Gurkha invasion but also took Kangra under its protection, ending the buffer between the two northern empires. All of winter Ranjit Singh had spent securing these lands.

If Qutubuddin chose to march towards Lahore, with the bulk of the armies campaigning in the hills, there would have been significant cause for worry. It was not that Lahore was unprotected, but Kasur’s armies were said to be significantly larger than they had ever been in the years before. Qutubuddin had raised the banner of Jihad, and warriors from all across the land, with zeal building mullahs in tow, had flocked to Kasur. And worse still, seeing this gathering strength, the Nawab of Multan, a large city-region to the south of Kasur, had broken his tributary relations with Lahore and joined up with Kasur! The crisis could reach tipping point if the third prominent Muslim ruler of the region, the Nawab of Bahawalpur, too joined in the cause and formed a triumvirate of Ghazi Warlords. This has not happened yet.

Ranjit Singh acted quickly. And smartly. He sent a message back to Lahore. (It is not known if the same unfortunate messenger who climbed up the mountains had to rush all the way back. If he did, he is one of the many unsung heroes whose names history has not recorded.)

Instructions were sent to the Maharajah’s Chief Minister, the noble Fakir Azizuddin. He was to go to Kasur, to parley – negotiate a truce. The Fakir was to be accompanied by the one senior general who was at Lahore at the time, the Sardar Fateh Singh Kallianwala. It could be assumed that the defence of Lahore at this time was left to a man less experienced but definitely not lacking in skill, commander of the Sher Dil Regiment, Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa. (We do not have definitive evidence that Hari Singh was with the Maharaja in Kangra, so it could be assumed he was at Lahore.)

The Nawab of Kasur agreed to meet. But the meeting did not go well. The Nawab has come with an agenda of his own. At the meeting, rather than listen to what the other party had to say, Qutubuddin proceeded to rebuke Fakir Azizuddin for serving an infidel King. (The Fakir was a Muslim.) The meeting served no purpose. Or perhaps it did.

In the meantime, while a request for the meeting was sent to Kasur, as the Fakir travelled there from Lahore, while he conducted the officialities, word was sent all across the lands of Punjab – whatever soldiers could be gathered by every chief, they were to march to Kasur. Would it be wrong to assume that Ranjit Singh had succeeded in what he hoped to achieve? He had bought time. And as armies from across Punjab marched towards Kasur, gathering at the village of Naushera, 10 miles away, the Nawab had squandered his advantage.

The Maharajah marched quickly towards Naushera too, accompanied by his best generals, the legendary Baba Phula Singh Akali, Sardar Nihal Singh Attariwala, Sardar Dhanna Singh Malwai, Sardar Jodh Singh Ramgarhia and Sardar Fateh Singh Ahluwalia. They were joined at Naushera by Sardar Fateh Singh Kalianwala, leading the reserves from Lahore.

When young Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa joined the gathering forces at Naushera, leading the Sher Dils, he would have perhaps for the first time seen the full force of the Khalsa Army, its organised infantry (in well cut red uniform with white sashes), masses of guns, cavalry and the most awesome of all, the fearless Nihangs. Attired in flowing robes of blue, with towering iron studded turbans, equipped with a broad sword and dagger each, with steel quoits (chakrams), some with bronze or iron claws for close combat, the Nihangs were the greatest nemesis of Ghazis. They were also the most difficult to tactically command and control in the battlefield.

The Maharajah had taken no chances. The problem of Kasur was to be solved once and for all. The twin cities of Lavah and Kush were to be united under the flag of the Khalsa. No quarters given.

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The immediate challenge before the Khalsa Army was the teeming army of Ghazis camped outside the formidable Kasur fort. He unleashed his own crusader warriors on them. They were to be dealt with through a frontal assault by the Nihangs led by Baba Phula Singh Akali. Once they were dispersed, the fort of Kasur would be sieged by the regular army, the infantry surrounding it, and the artillery of Muslim gunners taking positions to weaken the walls.

It was important that the siege be effective and surrender of the garrison be forced as quickly as possible. This, for two reasons. One, as we mentioned before, the Nawab of Multan, his lands about 150 miles south of Kasur, had thrown in his lot with Qutubuddin. The support Qutubuddin received from the wily Nawab of Multan was, at the moment, mostly moral. A largely self interested man, the Nawab of Multan would not throw significant blood and treasure into the cause unless he saw himself as coming out on the winning side. This would happen, if they received aid from a third party who was at the moment, neutral in the conflict.

To the east of Multan, the Nawabdom of Bahawalpur, straddling the frontier between Punjab and Rajasthan, was nominally independent. Now, if Bahawalpur joined up with Multan to aide Kasur, that would make trouble for the Sikhs. And what if the Afghans from Kabul or the petty Khans of Kashmir chose this opportunity to regain their lost Indian territories?

The commanders of the Khalsa Army would have been wary of another potential problem too. The Sikhs ruled over a land where they formed only a tiny part of the population. Their rule was seen as legitimate only because they were seen as a ‘fair’ ruling class. But notions of religious oppression – stoked by a Ghazi Army – could tip the balance in favour of local Muslim lords.

The urgency of dealing with these possible insurrections was the main reason why the Maharajah has brought the full force of the Lahore Armies to bear down on Kasur.

The show of force paid off.

The Nihangs routed the Ghazis. They began to flee. However, there was another army, behind the Ghazis, led by Qutubuddin himself. This was a more organised fighting force led by an able commander. The full frontal assault did not have the same effect. The battle, a historian writes, lasted all day. As the sun began to set, the armies of Kasur retreated into the fortress. There was to be no more engagement between the two armies for a month.

The formidable fort of Kasur was surrounded. And the siege camp settled in, Sikh guns attempting to breach the walls, while from within the fort, the Nawab’s guns rained down on them. No enforcements arrived from Multan or Bahawalpur, but the stalemate carried on.

*

The Sher Dil regiment had acquitted itself well during the battle of Kasur. After the initial phase, the horse riders had chased and captured many Ghazis. Towards the end of the siege they would come into action again.

But how was the siege brought to and end?

As time went on, it has become quite clear that faced with the accurate fire from inside the fort, the Sikh guns would not be able to breach the walls. So, for days before the end, sappers had begun to dig tunnels, stocking them with gunpowder, to blow up the foundations of the fort’s walls. This plan worked! (According to Hari Singh’s biographer Baba Prem Singh, the tunnel was dug by Hari Singh’s men overnight, at his behest. This seems unlikely. However, Hari Singh was most definitely involved in the planning process. He would use these tactics in subsequent sieges that he commanded, not long after Kasur.)

The Khalsa Army poured in through the breach. They faced fierce resistance from the Nawab’s men. In the melee of the two armies, the Nawab, however, managed to escape – perhaps hoping to continue the insurrection as a rebel. Considering his ability to draw men to his cause, the support of Multan and perhaps the heroic reputation that would be attached to him, he would have been a formidable thorn in Ranjit Singh’s side. But Hari Singh rose to the occasion again.

The Sher Dils chased the Nawab, defeated his small escort in close combat, and forced him to surrender. The Nawab was brought before Ranjit Singh in chains.

***

We can imagine the Durbar watching with bated breath as Qutubuddin was presented to the Maharajah. He had held at bay the full force of the Khalsa Army for a month. What punishment would be meted out to this formidable opponent?

The Maharajah’s decision was surprising but not shocking. Long years ago, not too far from Kasur, a conquered King in chains had been brought before another great empire builder. The name of Porus was a legend in the annals of history. King of a small frontier state, he had fought the fiercely against the largest army that history had ever seen – on the banks of the Beas, Alexander of Macedon, with his soldiers brought from Greece, Persia, Egypt and Bactria had battled the Punjabi King. After hard fought victory Alexander had embraced Porus and made him his ally.

Qutubuddin Kasuriya would be honoured by the Maharajah of Punjab as Porus was by Alexander. But this was the condition.

Kasur was attached to the Empire, the fort was too strong to be left uncontrolled. Qutubuddin was given an estate not too far away in Mamdoke. He would henceforth serve as a commander in the Empire’s fauj.

Not only had Ranjit Singh gained a valuable ally and secured the southern approach to Lahore through the control of Kasur and its fort, he had also nipped the ghazi rebellion in the bud. (Not the first he would face!)

There was, however, one more thing to do. Teach the wily Nawab of Multan a lesson. For this, he chose Hari Singh Nalwa.

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Continues in Chapter 3.

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